

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 05209 01 OF 03 251808Z

51 50

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 AECE-00

AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07

DRC-01 USIE-00 /115 W

----- 014071

O R 251330Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7766

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5209

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT: PARA 3.)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: NPG REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON COMMUNICATING
NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REF: A. USNATO 5194

B. NPG/STUDY/46

C. USNATO 4903

D. NPG(STAFF GROUP) WP(74)10(REVISED), DATED AUGUST 13, 1974

E. USNATO 4891

SUMMARY: MISSION PROVIDES IN PARA 4 BELOW REVISED DRAFT NPG PERMREPS
REPORT ON THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI)
WHICH REFLECT UK AND CANADIAN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE FURTHER
STUDY OF THE USE OF WARNING MESSAGES AND PROCEDURES TO ASSIST IN
CNI CONSULTATION. NPG STAFF GROUP WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT REPORT
ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05209 01 OF 03 251808Z

ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 27. END
SUMMARY.

1. MISSION PROVIDES IN PARA 4 BELOW REVISED DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT

ON THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (CNI) ISSUED BY IS AS A RESULT OF NPG STAFF GROUP DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 23 (REF A). COMMENT: MISSION POUCHED FINAL TEXT OF CNI STUDY (REF B) TO WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 24. HOWEVER, DRAFT TEXT OF STUDY IN REF C, WHICH DIFFERS LITTLE IN SUBSTANCE FROM FINAL TEXT, WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE BASIS FOR WASHINGTON EVALUATION OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT. END COMMENT.

2. THE REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT IS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS VERSION (REF D), WITH TWO PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES. FIRST, NEW PARA 15 REFLECTS UK AND CANADIAN CONCERN TO HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER STUDY OF USE OF WARNING MESSAGES AND OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES TO ASSIST CNI CONSULTATION. SECOND, NEW PARA 16 (RECOMMENDATIONS) DROPS THE IDEA OF FORWARDING THE CNI STUDY TO THE DPC AND CALLS FOR NPG PERMREPS TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS ARE IDENTIFIED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.

3. MISSION COMMENT: WE DOUBT THE DESIRABILITY OF A STUDY OF THE USE OF WARNING MESSAGES BECAUSE, AS MISSION STATED IN PARA 4 REF E, THEY INTRODUCE A CONCEPT, THE NATURE OF WHICH COULD PREJUDICE A NUCLEAR RELEASE DECISION AND LESSEN US CONTROL IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. ADDITIONALLY, THE NOTION OF QUOTE A SET OF PROCEDURES TO ASSIST CNI CONSULTATION UNQUOTE COULD POSE DIFFICULTIES IF IT INVOLVED DETAILED OR RIGID PROCEDURES THAT LESSENED FLEXIBILITY IN THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS. HOWEVER, CANADIAN AND UK REPS STATE THAT OTTAWA AND LONDON ARE INTENT ON RAISING THESE QUESTIONS IN THE PERMREPS REPORT. THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 16(C) OF THE DRAFT REPORT (PARA 4 BELOW) WOULD PROVIDE FOR NPG PERMREPS TO REVIEW THESE QUESTIONS IN LIGHT OF MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION AT ROME TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ANY FURTHER STUDY SHOULD BE DONE. MINDFUL OF THE RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED ABOVE, MISSION BELIEVES THIS APPROACH WOULD BE SATISFACTORY SINCE IT WOULD PERMIT A MORE DELIVERATE EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY UK AND CANADA AND IT WOULD PROVIDE A CONTEXT IN WHICH TO DISPOSE OF THEM WITHOUT FURTHER DETAILED STUDY IF THAT CONCLUSION IS WARRENTED. ADDITIONALLY,
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05209 01 OF 03 251808Z

WE SEE NO HARM IN NOT FORWARDING THE CNI STUDY TO THE DPC AT THIS TIME. THE STUDY COULD BE FORWARDED TO THE DPC LATER AFTER NPG PERMREPS HAVE REVIEWED THE QUESTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. MISSION RECOMMENDS WASHINGTON APPROVAL OF THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT IN PARA 4 BELOW. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE AND COMMENTS PRIOR TO FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, WHEN THE NPG STAFF GROUP WILL MEET TO COMPLETE PREPARATION OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

(NOTE: TEXT DOES NOT INCLUDE A PARA 7.)

AMENDED VERSION OF
NPG(STAFF GROUP)WP(74)10
(REVISED)

COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DRAFT REPORT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

I. PURPOSE

1. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES SOME POSSIBLE AREAS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1).

II. BACKGROUND

2. AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY, 1973, THE NPG MINISTERS CONSIDERED A REPORT(2) CONTAINING SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION ASPECTS OF WINTEX 73, AND A REPORT(3) COMMENTING ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON DEMONSTRATIVE USE(U), BOTH OF WHICH COMMENTED ON THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR DISCUSSION, THE MINISTERS INVITED(5) THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO AN ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, AND ON RELATED PROCEDURAL MATTERS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05209 01 OF 03 251808Z

(1) NPG/STUDY/46, 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1974. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE CNI STUDY. AS IN THE STUDY ITSELF, THE ABBREVIATION CNI IS USED IN THIS REPORT TO REPLACE THE PHRASE "COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION."

(2) NPG/D(73)3, 17TH APRIL, 1973

(3) NPG/D(73)4, 17TH APRIL, 1973

(4) NPG/STUDY(71)4, 11TH MARCH, 1971, ENCLOSURE 2

(5) NPG/D(73)7, 21ST MAY, 1973, PARAGRAPH 16

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05209 02 OF 03 251503Z

50

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 AECE-00

AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07

DRC-01 USIE-00 /115 W

----- 012051

O R 251330Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7767

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5209

3. A STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP, COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN NPG ACTIVITIES. PERSONNEL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF, SHAPE AND SACLANT ALSO CONTRIBUTED.

4. THE CNI STUDY DEALS PRIMARILY WITH A QUESTION THAT WOULD CONFRONT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES IF THEY SHOULD BE CONSULTING ON REQUESTS OR PROPOSALS FOR NATO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS DEFENCE, NAMELY, WHETHER TO MAKE A COMMUNICATION EFFORT(1) IN PARALLEL WITH THE USE ITSELF IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF, AND REASONS FOR, THAT PARTICULAR USE. THE STUDY ALSO LOOKS AT THE QUESTION OF HOW TO CARRY OUT A CNI ACTION IF A DECISION IS REACHED TO DO SO. TOWARD THESE ENDS, IT IDENTIFIES AND EXAMINES THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH CNI QUESTIONS, AND DISCUSSES SOME PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF HANDLING THE MATTER ALTHOUGH THE DPC GUIDANCE IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05209 02 OF 03 251503Z

TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO(2), USED AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN THE CNI STUDY, DEALS ONLY WITH SELECTIVE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT, WE AGREE WITH THE OBSERVATION IN THE CNI STUDY(3) THAT NATO WOULD HAVE TO GIVE CONSIDERATION, TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING, TO QUESTIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION WHENEVER ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE COVERED BY THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURE ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (4) ARISES. IN OUR OPINION, THE CNI STUDY MAKES A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS.

(1) A CNI ACTION WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE NATO'S INTENTION IN REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE MESSAGE OR MESSAGES THEMSELVES.

(2) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES.

(3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 9

(4) DPC/D(69)59, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1969.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE MINISTERS MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE SEVERAL POSSIBLE AREAS FOR DISCUSSION SET OUT IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS. THIS LISTING IS NOT INTENDED TO BE EXHAUSTIVE OR RESTRICTIVE, OR TO PRECLUDE THE MINISTERS FROM RAISING OTHER POINTS THEY MAY WISH TO DISCUSS.

III. POSSIBLE AREAS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION

ROLE OF A CNI ACTION

6. THE CNI STUDY POINTS OUT(1) THAT A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF A CNI ACTION IS THE REINFORCEMENT OF NATO'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE ESCALATION PROCESS BY REDUCING THE RISK OF ESCALATION BY THE ENEMY RESULTING FROM HIS MISINTERPRETATION OF THE NATURE OF NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES(2) AND, IN MORE GENERAL TERMS, IS NOTED IN OUR REPORT(3) ON THE STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05209 02 OF 03 251503Z

MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(4). SINCE A CNI ACTION, IN THE SENSE THAT THE TERM IS USED IN THE CNI STUDY, IS DIRECTLY LINKED WITH A PARTICULAR OCCASION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE, IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THAT USE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, A CNI ACTION SHOULD NOT UNDERCUT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE USE WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED. AS NOTED IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES,

(1) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 18

(2) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 38

(3) DPC/D(74)18, 5TH AUGUST, 1974, PARAGRAPH 7

(4) ANNEX TO DPC/D(74)18

THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IS TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW(1). THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FURTHER EMPHASISE THE NEED TO CONTROL ESCALATION(2). ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ALSO RECOGNISE THAT THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION BY NATO COULD BE AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT IN INDUCING THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION NATO WANTS HIM TO REACH(3). WE THINK THAT IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY THAT IS INHERENT IN THE PARTICULAR USE ITSELF WOULD CLEARLY CONVEY NATO'S INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THESE TWO BASIC POINTS. WHILE THE ACTUAL USE MIGHT BE OBSERVED BY THE ENEMY TO

BE LIMITED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER (FOR EXAMPLE, IN TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT OPTION, NUMBERS OF WARHEADS USED, KIND AND NUMBER OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS EMPLOYED, AREA OF EMPLOYMENT, KIND OF TARGETS ATTACKED, DURATION OF USE), THIS FACTOR ALONG WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE TAKEN BY HIM AS A VALID INDICATION OF NATO'S DELIBERATE DECISION TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON ITSELF. SIMILARLY, ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL USE IS INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLVE TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THAT PARTICULAR SITUATION(4), IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE READ BY THE ENEMY AS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT NATO WAS PREPARED TO ESCALATE FURTHER.

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 21

(2) SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 23-27, 36-38, 49, 52, 59, 70, 95, 96.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05209 02 OF 03 251503Z

(3) SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 1, 3, 21, 28, 38, 50, 53, 57, 95

(4) SEE ALSO CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 17

8. AS BOTH THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES(1) AND THE CNI STUDY(2) POINT OUT, A CNI ACTION WITH ITS ELEMENTS OF EXPLANATION AND OF WARNING COULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARD REMOVING THESE AMBIGUITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY ALSO HAVE POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES(3).

WE CONCUR WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE CNI STUDY(4) THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT NATO SHOULD TAKE A CNI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR USE WOULD BE BASED ON AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF A MIX OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE CONFLICTING, AND DIFFICULT TO WEIGH. WE ALSO NOTE THAT A CNI ACTION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS AN ISOLATED STEP, BUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING SERIES OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS, DESIGNED TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN MOTION FROM THE START OF THE AGGRESSION. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE AGREE WITH THE CNI STUDY(5) THAT THE CONTENT OF A CNI ACTION SHOULD BE IN HARMONY WITH OTHER PRECEDING AND CONCURRENT NATO ACTIONS SO AS TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREDIBILITY.

COMMUNICATING TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC

9. WHILE WE AGREE WITH THE THRUST OF THE CNI STUDY(6) THAT CNI MESSAGES SHOULD BE TAILORED TO FIT DIFFERENT AUDIENCES, I.E., THE ENEMY, OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC, WE STRESS THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALL OF THE CNI MESSAGES PERTAINING TO A PARTICULAR USE DO NOT CONTAIN CONFLICTING OR AMBIGUOUS EXPLANATIONS OF NATO'S INTENTION. THIS IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY MISINTERPRETATION, BECAUSE IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE ENEMY WOULD OBTAIN KNOWLEDGE OF CNI MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC. AS A RELATED COMMENT, WE NOTE THAT THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING IN TIME OF TENSION AND HOSTILITIES WITH OTHER

COUNTRIES

AND THE PUBLIC, NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO CNI ACTIONS, MIGHT BE A SUBJECT WORTHY OF STUDY ON ITS OWN IN A BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 05209 03 OF 03 251442Z

50

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 AECE-00

AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07

DRC-01 USIE-00 /115 W

----- 011854

O R 251330Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7768

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 5209

-
- (1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 39-42, 47, 95
 - (2) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 18
 - (3) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 39, 40; CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 14.
 - (4) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 25.
 - (5) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 15
 - (6) SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 28.
-

TIMING OF CNI ACTION

10. THE OBSERVATION IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS CONFIRM THE CONCLUSION IN THE CNI STUDY(1) THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT NATO SHOULD TAKE A CNI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A SPECIFIC USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN ONLY BE FULLY ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS AT THE TIME THE DECISION OF IMPLEMENTING SUCH USE IS MADE AND THAT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING A CNI ACTION, IF A DECISION IS REACHED TO DO SO, WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 05209 03 OF 03 251442Z

LIGHT OF EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS STEP COULD BE TAKEN BEFORE,

DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE USE IN QUESTION.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

11. IN DEALING WITH THE MILITARY ASPECTS, THE CNI STUDY RECOGNISES(2) THAT CNI ACTIONS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE. HOWEVER, THE STUDY ALSO NOTES(3) THAT, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, FAILURE TO TAKE A CNI ACTION COULD LEAD TO MILITARY CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD BE MORE DISADVANTAGEOUS THAN THOSE STEMMING FROM A LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE. WE AGREE WITH THE STUDY CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED AT THE TIME THE NEED RAISES AGAINST THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF A CNI SECTION IN MINIMISING THE RISK OF ESCALATION BY THE ENEMY.

-
- (1) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 25
 - (2) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 21
 - (3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPHS 21-22
-

12. IN POINTING OUT THE NECESSITY FOR CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES DURING ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON CNI QUESTIONS, THE STUDY RECOGNISES THAT PROVISIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER TO INCLUDE IN HIS RELEASE REQUEST THE MILITARY OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, TO ANNOUNCEMENTS BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES ON NATO'S INTENDED USE(1). DURING NATO EXERCISES IN THE PAST THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAVE REFLECTED THIS PROVISION IN THEIR RELEASE REQUEST BY A GENERAL STATEMENT THAT THERE ARE NO MILITARY OBJECTIONS TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. WE NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT THAT A CNI MESSAGE TO AN ENEMY SHOULD NOT BE SO VAGUE AS TO PROVOKE THE ENEMY OVER-REACTION THAT THE MESSAGE SEEKS TO FORESTALL.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

13. IN AGREEMENT WITH THE STUDY(2), WE EMPHASISE THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTING WITHIN NATO ON CNI QUESTIONS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR CONSULTATION PROCEDURES(3) AND HAVE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS OF SIMPLICITY, FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY TO ADAPT TO PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE ARE IN AGREEMENT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 05209 03 OF 03 251442Z

WITH THE CNI STUDY'S OBSERVATION THAT THE PROCESS OF REACHING DECISIONS ON CNI QUESTIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LARGER

-
- (1) CNI STUDY, ANNEX, PARAGRAPH 6
 - (2) CNI STUDY, ANNEX, PARAGRAPH 3
 - (3) DPC/D(69)59, PARAGRAPHS II.3 AND 888.2
-

PROCESS OF CONSULTING ON PROPOSALS OR REQUESTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE(1) AND THAT THE COUNCIL/DPC SHOULD BE THE NORMAL FORUM FOR

CONSULTATION ON THIS SUBJECT(2).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

14. NOTING THAT SPECIFIC DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO CNI ACTIONS CAN ONLY BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXIST AT THE TIME THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IS UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE CNI STUDY EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT IT IS NEVERTHELESS ESSENTIAL THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES FAMILIARISE THEMSELVES NOW WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FACTORS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH THE CNI QUESTION IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES(3).

15. IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT THE STUDY ADDRESSES ONLY THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING THE INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ITS CENTRAL THEME IS TO EXPLAIN THE USE AND TO WARN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER USE. IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A WARNING MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT PRIOR TO THE NUCLEAR USE DECISION, NOR WHETHER SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BE SENT AFTER A DECISION BUT PRIOR TO ACTUAL USE. FURTHERMORE, THE STUDY HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO EXAMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO DEVELOP A SET OF PROCEDURES TO ASSIST CNI CONSULTATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP SHOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO SUCH QUESTIONS DURING ITS WORK IN THE FUTURE.

-
- (1) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 13; ANNEX, PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5
(2) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 4
(3) CNI STUDY, PARAGRAPH 38
-

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 05209 03 OF 03 251442Z

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

16. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINISTERS:
- (A) TAKE NOTE OF THE CNI STUDY;
 - (B) DISCUSS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE CNI STUDY AND
IN PART III OF THIS REPORT;
 - (C) AGREE THAT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD
CONSIDER FURTHER SUCH QUESTIONS AS ARE IDENTIFIED IN
PARAGRAPH 15 ABOVE.

END TEXT
RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO05209
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740988/abbryxje.tel
Line Count: 481
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 5194 B. NPG/STUDY/46 C. USNATO 4903 D. NPG(STAFF GROUP) WP(74)10(REVISED), DATED AUGUST 13, 1974
E. USNATO 4891
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <15-Aug-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPG REVISED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005